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A CHAPTER IN THE STORY OF ROMAN IMPERIALISM

BY TENNEY FRANK

"La proclamation de l'indépendance . . . s'explique aussi bien par un machiavélisme raffiné que par un philhellénisme sincère," says Colin¹ in discussing the end of the second Macedonian war. As a matter of fact, the present-day historians of Rome have with a monotonous unanimity employed those two terms when attempting to explain Rome's purposes in invading the East. Mommsen vigorously combats the charge—a very old one—that Rome was capable of nothing but unscrupulous cleverness. He insists that Flamininus was inspired by a sincere love for Hellas, though, true to the spirit of Bismarck's day, he adds that this blind sentiment must be considered no less criminal than the alleged lack of principle. The majority, however, well represented by Ihne, Peter, and Duruy, have reverted to the older charge of machiavelianism. It would seem as if our historians, saturated in the diplomacy of the nineteenth century, will not read the history of a simpler day simply, for fear of incurring the suspicion of being simpletons. At any rate, it is difficult to escape the conviction that they are detecting too many of the inventions of the modern political game in the tentative statesmanship of an ingenuous bourgeois senate.

The modern historian was not the first to commit this sin. The taint of contemporary theory was quick to touch even the Roman historians who treated the times of Flamininus. Rome had full possession of Greece within fifty years after perpetual freedom was so pompously proclaimed at the Isthmian games of 196. In view of that fact it would be surprising if the diplomacy of Mummius, of Sulla, of Caesar, and of Augustus had not influenced the successively contemporaneous historians to attribute their newfound cleverness to the senate of Scipio's day.

I propose in this paper to trace in outline the growth of Roman imperialism through the period of 200–180 B. C. and at

¹ *Rome et la Grèce*, p. 83.

the same time to examine some of the historical sources of the period with a view to eliminating anachronisms of the kind that I have just indicated. Perhaps I may also be permitted now and then to question the accuracy of our historians in interpreting those sources, if by doing so I can make my own point more readily understood. As for the influence of the events that precede the year 200, I shall attempt to make the correct deductions without discussion. To be sure, if one were to give a complete treatment of the subject, one would be compelled to review the history of Rome from its very beginnings. In this paper, however, I must begin at the point where it is usually alleged that imperialism was emerging into a policy which was to be adopted or rejected with full consciousness of its meaning.

A discussion of the wars within Italy up to the limits of the natural boundaries is not absolutely essential to the question in hand. The Roman statesmen did not appeal to the history of the conquest of Italy¹ for precedent to determine Rome's foreign policy. Again, no one would seriously contend that the Carthaginian wars were in any literal sense undertaken for the sake of conquest. In that life-and-death struggle, Rome, whether through actual or imagined necessity, involved herself in the possession of foreign territory in Sicily and Spain, but her refusal to touch African soil quite clearly indicates that she had little desire for any land-holding other than was absolutely necessary for the immediate safeguarding of Italy. The continued possession of Spain does not refute this general statement, since that territory had been seized for the purpose of cutting off Punic resources during the war, and was later held through characteristic Roman inability to execute a retreat.

In seeking the first evidences of a definite Roman policy of foreign conquest for the sake of permanent possession, it is usual to begin with the invasion of the East, or, more exactly, with the

¹There are a few significant phrases connected with the ceremonies that preceded the declaration of war and with the ancient regulation of triumphs which show how closely warfare was associated with the extension of territory. Such are the frequently occurring words *prolatio finium* and *propagare fines* (cf. Livy xxxi. 5. 7, and Cic. *De rep.* 3. 24). These phrases, however, were stereotyped by the year 200 and were apparently not taken literally as containing any requirements in extra-marine warfare.

second Macedonian war. Rome, of course, had even before that war secured a foothold on the Greek coast, but only because of the necessity of suppressing the Illyrian pirates who had been plundering Italian seaports. Somewhat later Philip, by his treacherous move against Rome in the worst days of the Punic war, compelled her to invade Macedonia in order to form a coalition of Greeks against Philip. No new possessions, however, accrued to Rome from this invasion. She was satisfied with having diverted Philip, and, when the Aetolians withdrew from the quarrel, she signed a treaty with Philip accepting the *status quo ante*.

Coming now to the second Macedonian war, I shall take space only to point out some inaccuracies of our sources in their treatment of Rome's motives for undertaking the war, and in their statements concerning the terms of peace offered and the final settlement made. By doing so, I hope to indicate the way to a safer interpretation of the facts.

The motives of the Romans in entering upon the war were seemingly not clearly understood by the historians of a hundred years later. At any rate they found Rome's reasons inadequate, and felt the necessity of adding others more plausible in the light of contemporaneous politics. To illustrate this point, I shall contrast the account of Polybius with the accounts of later writers. From Polybius (Book xvi) we get a simple statement of the case: Philip had attacked possessions of Attalus, Rhodes, Egypt, and Athens; these powers, being "friends" of Rome appealed to her for aid; Rome declared war in response to these petitions. That is all. I find no implication in Polybius that Rome's reasons were then considered insufficient. And yet from that time to this, with the exception of Mommsen—who has his own way of justifying success—writers have found it difficult to pardon Rome's behavior. This is not surprising. If we are to rely upon Polybius, we must conclude that Rome entered the war for the defense of nations with whom she had treaties of "friendship" (*amicitia*) only, and not of defensive alliance. Since Rome was not in the habit of acting in this way during the late Republic, historians naturally sought more adequate explanations. In the first place,

Livy revises the list of appealing nations. He gives the position of importance to Aetolia,¹ feeling, doubtless, that the other powers mentioned were not so closely bound to Rome as to justify her in undertaking a war in their defense. Aetolia had at least been an ally in one war. Livy furthermore adds the alleged fact that Philip had recently offered aid to Hannibal against Rome (Livy xxxi. 1. 10 and 11. 10), a story which has, of course, no respectable foundation. Pompeius Trogus has the same fiction and produces it as the predominant cause of the war. At the ingenuous motivation of Polybius he can only sneer: *Titulo ferendi sociis auxilii bellum aduersus Philippum decernitur* (Just. xxx. 3. 6; cf. Livy xxxi. 14. 6, *haudquaquam digna causa*). Cassius Dio writes in the same spirit: *χρώμενοι μὲν τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπι-βασίᾳ λαβῆν*,—Fr. lvii. 1. It is evident then that these historians had some difficulty in finding a justification for Rome's declaration of war. Their skepticism as to the sincerity of Rome's profession is regularly assumed to be well founded. It is my conviction that all these doubts rest upon a misunderstanding of the obligation which a treaty of *amicitia* entailed in the earlier days of Rome.

We know that in the last century of the Republic, when Rome was supreme, all treaties, whatever their polite wording, were in their execution favorable to Rome. Not only were the *socii* obliged to send their contingent to Rome at call, but the *amici*, too, knew that they did not possess the privilege of neutrality if Rome was at war. On the other hand, Rome was under no obligation to reciprocate when the *amici* were in distress. Her "friends" might come to the senate and humbly petition for aid, but they usually returned *infecta re* (cf. the case of the Aedui, Caes. *B. G.* 6. 12 and 1. 33). In view of this consideration, we forget—as the Romans themselves soon forgot—that the term *amicitia* must have involved *mutual* obligations in the early days of Rome's foreign administration. We know, of course, that a treaty of "friendship" did not, strictly speaking, impose the necessities of a defensive alliance. All that it distinctly guaran-

¹Livy xxxi. 1. 9: *uacuos deinde pace Punica iam Romanos et infensos Philippo cum ob infidam aduersus Aetolos aliosque regionis eiusdem socios pacem tum ob auxilia cum pecunia nuper in Africam missa Hannibali, etc.*

teed was peace between the contracting parties.¹ It is evident, however, that in practice it contemplated mutual aid of a practical sort unless the friend was otherwise engaged and could not render aid without offense to other allies. Certainly Rome's *amici*, even in the days when she was not so powerful as to be awe-inspiring, felt that treaties of this kind placed them under some such obligation. The behavior of the Achaean league in 192 (see Livy xxxv. 50), the tone of Ptolemy's message to Rome in 200 (Livy xxxi. 9) and his offer in 190 (Livy xxxvi. 4) as well as that of Masinissa in the same year (*ibid.*) will illustrate the spirit in which the other signatories of such treaties viewed the obligations which they involved.

I believe that Rome's action in declaring war in 200 on the appeal of four of her *amici* is proof that Rome then assumed that in signing treaties of friendship she was accepting the same obligations toward her friends as they toward her. Why should she not? Rome had then a very sincere respect for Philip, Antiochus, Rhodes, and Attalus. Doubtless she would not have suggested in 200, weakened as she was at that time, that she was *facile princeps* among these *amici*. She considered her friends as her peers then, and seeing things in that light, she was ready to interpret the written and implied obligations of her treaties as liberally as did her friends. Her behavior during the war favors this interpretation. It is evident from Polybius (Books xvi-xviii) that Attalus is considered the head of the war at first; Rome is merely sending aid to equals as a friend. It is not till the Roman generals and the Roman armies have proved their ability to secure results that they become the recognized leaders; and it is not till Philip, disgusted with the unending parleyings of the Greek legates, asks permission to treat with Flamininus alone that the pre-eminence of the Romans is acknowledged. If Philip had defeated the coalition at the end of the three years' struggle, history would not have spoken of this as a Roman war.

There is another act of Rome's at this time which reveals the fact that the Romans then accepted a treaty of *amicitia* as involving practical obligations. In the year 200, having signed a treaty

¹δπλα μὴ φέρει επὶ ἀλλήλους, App. B. C. 4. 66.

of "friendship" with Masinissa, Rome sent envoys to him who were ordered "polliceri si quid sibi ad firmandum augendumque regnum opus esse indicasset, enixe id populum Rom. merito eius praestaturum" (Livy. xxxi. 11. 12). My conclusion then is that in the days (and they were not many) when Rome still considered the eastern powers as her equals, she in all good faith undertook to interpret the various treaties in as generous a spirit as they did; that under certain conditions of proximity and need, it was at that time customary to render mutual aid in warfare on the basis of a mere treaty of *amicitia*; that therefore the reasons which Rome put forth for attacking Philip in 200 need not be questioned as inadequate in spite of the skepticism of later writers. To be sure, Rome did not need more than ten years' experience in the East to learn that her friends were not absolutely necessary to her existence and that their aid was by no means worth full payment in kind. When she had made this discovery, the word *amicitia* lost some of its importance to her. Rome still permitted her "friends" to help her at times, but she soon ceased to return the favor. By the time that Rome had so far outgrown her friends as to become their virtual master, the historians had no way of understanding Rome's earlier professions. Hence it is that we have heard so much of "pretexts," "hypocrisy," "political calculation," "commercialism,"¹ and all the rest, in the later accounts of the second Macedonian war.

¹I have little room for controversy, but I may be allowed an occasional note on the excellent work of Colin, quoted above, since it is the most recent discussion that deals with our subject. Colin, pp. 90 ff., expanding a hint of Mommsen's, tries to show that Rome was strongly influenced by her commercial interest in undertaking this war. Surely those interests had an exceedingly weak voice in the governmental policies of the time. We hear of no strong financial society until 215, and that was apparently formed upon request to raise money when the state was in great distress (Livy xxiii. 48). The civilization that brought forth the Porcian legislation and the laws forbidding senators to engage in commerce could hardly require many of the products of the East. Colin's view that the *publicani* had learned through their business in Sicily to desire increase in domain is not plausible. We know that Sicily had hitherto been a burden, not a source of wealth. If commercial interests were powerful enough to exert an influence, they doubtless used it in protesting against the war as did the heavily taxed farmers, for a part of the old loans of 215 were still unpaid and overdue. In fact the senate had to mortgage public lands as security for the instalment due in 200 (Livy xxxi. 13). The day came when commercial interests could force the state to extend her conquests, but it was not in the year 200 nor for many a year then to come. I may add that Colin's skepticism about Rome's sincerity often prevents his acceptance of the

In the accounts of the peace conference at Tempe there are also a few slight misconceptions due to anachronistic interpretation of facts. Polybius¹ shows clearly in the terms offered at Nicaea that Rome had no intention of holding any part of Greek territory surrendered by Philip (Pol. xviii. 1-8), but even he is writing long enough after events to permit a phrase of latter-day color to slip into his narration. The error is a mere trifle, only the insertion of the adverb *εὐθέως*, but it is enough to show how soon Rome's earlier policy began to be misunderstood. In the speech attributed to Flamininus (xviii. 37. 2) the general is explaining why he refuses to dethrone Philip; he is represented as saying: "You do not understand the policy of Rome; *οὐτε γὰρ Ῥωμαίους οὐδέσι τὸ πρῶτον πολεμήσαντας εὐθέως ἀναστάτους ποιεῖν τούτους. πίστιν δ' ἔχειν . . . ἐκ τῶν κατ' Ἀννίβαν*; i. e., "You may judge from our treatment of Carthage that Rome is not in the custom of destroying her enemies *at once!*" Is Flamininus capable of implying that Rome will *ultimately* destroy Carthage and Macedonia? The words are so inconsistent with his entire behavior that I think we must decide that they misreport him. Polybius wrote this part of his history after the capture of Perseus, probably even after the fall of Carthage and Corinth. The implication of

simplest interpretation of facts. For instance, he repeatedly points out that the Greeks of 200 B. c. suspected the altruistic professions of the Romans and he adduces their attitude as ground for his skepticism. Now, anyone who reads Pol. x. 25, App. *Mac.* 9. 3, Paus. vii. 8. 1, Just. xxix. 2, Livy xxx. 25. 14, will be convinced that there was much of this suspicion, even if he attributes half of the language he there finds to *vaticinia ex eventu*. Nevertheless, Greek suspicion does not prove the Romans hypocrites. The petty Greek states had learned in a hundred years of struggle with ambitious despots like Philip and Antiochus to suspect the professions of the strong. These despots had inherited the policies of Alexander, the first successful imperialist. He and his successors had created the atmosphere of suspicion and fear in which the Greeks now lived. It would be strange, therefore, if the Greeks had not feared that the Romans in coming east would use the methods they had seen in operation at home. I admit that there was much fear and suspicion, but the presence of this does not seem to have been based upon any accurate knowledge of Roman methods.

¹ It seems clear to me. Colin, however, assumes that Flamininus was the author of the movement to liberate Greece, and that he was compelled to struggle with the senate for years to accomplish his purpose (p. 89). Yet the very first message sent to Philip in 200, when Flamininus was still a nonentity in the senate, was strongly philhellenic; *μήτε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μηδενὶ πολεμεῖν* (Pol. xvi. 34), and the wording of the first offer of peace made by the senate strongly implies that the senate had no intention of retaining any Greek territory. Note the contrast in *ἐκ μὲν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ἐκχωρεῖν . . . τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα τόπους παραδοῦναι Ῥωμαῖοι* (Pol. xviii. 1. 13).

his report must be explained as an anachronism. Appian (*Mac.* 9. 2) falls into the same error by following Polybius. His words are: *οὐ οὐδένα πω τῶν ἐχθρῶν εὐθὺς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀνέτρεψαν*. Livy is clear-headed enough this once to emend his Polybius, for he writes: “illos prioribus omnibus conciliis conloquiisque de condicionibus pacis semper <non> ut ad internectionem bellaretur disseruisse, etc.” (xxxiii. 12. 6). In a nearby passage, however, he betrays a temporary misunderstanding of Rome’s purposes in Greece. Mis-translating a sentence of Polybius (xviii. 36) he falls into the error of reporting a quarrel between Flamininus and the Aetolians regarding the possession of Thebes: *disceptatio inter imperatorem Romanum et Aetolos orta est de Thebis; nam eas populi Romani jure belli factas esse* Quintius dicebat (xxxiii. 13. 7). In the original account of Polybius there is no implication that Rome is asserting her own claims to any part of the captured territory.

The important items in the treaty of peace were, according to Polybius, the immediate liberation of the Greek cities in Asia Minor and Thrace, the transference to the Romans of the surrendered cities in Greece before the Isthmian games, the surrender of the Macedonian army, and the payment of a war indemnity in ten annual instalments. Later historians could easily have consulted the original documents, but apparently they did not. Instead they added items consonant with the spirit of aggrandizement which held sway in their own day. Thus, for instance, Quadrigarius (see Livy xxxiii. 30. 8) includes among the terms an agreement to pay a “vectigal” for thirty years, a requirement which would imply a condition of dependence not contemplated by the Romans. Livy, probably drawing upon the annalists, adds as further items of the treaty: *bellum extra Macedoniae fines ne iniussu senatus gereret* (Philippus), and, *ne plus quinque milia armatorum haberet*. Such requirements would necessarily make Macedonia a Roman dependency, whereas the treaty as given by Polybius merely provides for the liberation of the Greek states without adding restrictions that would necessitate constant interference from Rome. Even here, then, it is evident that the

¹Nissen *Krit. U.*, p. 146, proves on external grounds that these items cannot have been part of the treaty.

ascendant imperialism of a later day is coloring the accounts of Rome's earlier foreign policy.

The Greek and Roman historians betray few inconsistencies or disagreements in treating of the final settlement of affairs in 194-92 and of the final evacuation. It is all the stranger, therefore, that the majority of the modern discussions of the subject should be full of cynicism regarding Rome's purpose. Our historians suspect that the senate did not intend to leave Greece entirely (cf. Colin), or that the settlement of Flamininus virtually consisted in establishing pro-Roman oligarchies which would eventually bring Roman influence back to Greece (cf. Niese), or that the liberation, in so far as it was not an act entirely contrary to political calculation, was, after all, the product of an unreasoning philhellenism (cf. Mommsen).

As for the first point, the suspicion is based upon no definite proof. Since there happens likewise to be no definite refutation, we must rely upon the logic of related facts for a decision, and this militates against the suspicion. Whenever we can find any indication of the senate's purposes in the early stages of the war, they all point quite distinctly in one direction. The senate's first envoy to Philip demanded that he cease attacking Greek cities. The first terms offered by the senate required the evacuation of Greece but the restoration to Rome of the Illyrian territory—a contrast of treatment that implies the intention of liberating the former. The senate's provision that Philip must withdraw his garrisons before the Isthmian games reveals the fact that the senate itself had planned the spectacular proclamation of freedom and intended to make it comprehensive. The apparent permission granted to the decemviri to hold the "three fetters of Greece" until the immediate danger from Antiochus should pass over does not reveal any desire on the senate's part to retain them permanently. Had the senate desired them it would have given some slight hint of that desire, whereas apparently the commissioners hardly knew whether or no the matter had been discussed. Furthermore, the settlement of Greek affairs was intrusted to Flamininus: assurance enough that the senate had no desire to pursue a selfish course. In fact, for ten years to come, Rome by

sending Flamininus to Greece whenever trouble arose there showed unmistakably her adherence to a policy especially represented by him. That policy demanded complete and perfect liberty for all Greeks and was well set forth in the unequivocal message to Antiochus: *οὐδένα γάρ ἔτι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔτε πολεμεῖσθαι νῦν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε δουλεύειν οὐδενί* (Pol. xviii. 47). The Roman senate would not have stood sponsor for that ultimatum with its five negatives if it had coveted any part of Greek soil.

For the second point there is absolutely no proof. Flamininus was, to be sure, occupied for a large part of the year 194 in a journey of readjustment through the Greek cities. The best indication of what there was to do and the excellent way in which he did it is to be found in the famous inscription of the Kyretiae, Ditt. 278: *ἔπει καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσιν φανερὰν πεποήκαμεν τὴν τε ἴδιαν καὶ τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀρμαίων προαίρεσιν ἦν ἔχομεν εἰς ὑμᾶς ὀλοσχερᾶς, ὅσαι γάρ ποτε ἀπολείπονται κτήσεις ἔγγειοι καὶ οἰκίαι πάσας δίδομεν τῇ ὑμετέραι πόλει*, etc. The historian has lived too long in the atmosphere of continental diplomacy, who, after reading that declaration, has no comment but: "es geschah alles um die römische Hegemonie sicher zu begründen" (see Niese, p. 666). I have failed to find any proof that there was as yet, in fact or in contemplation, a Roman "Hegemonie" over Greece. Nor is there any reasonable ground for Colin's charge (p. 167) that Flamininus' readjustment of Thessaly was governed by political calculation on the principle of *divide ut imperes*. Thessaly had not revealed a homogeneity that would justify Rome in establishing it as a single, autonomous state.

Lastly the assumption that a foolish sentiment of philhellenism, originating with Flamininus and finally extending through the senate, saved Greece from a treatment that Rome, it is alleged, was accustomed to mete out to all she subdued seems to me to go farther than the facts allow. Rome's withdrawal from Greece is better explained on the ground that Rome had as yet no desire to follow a policy of aggrandizement. I find no reason to suppose that Rome then intended to apply the *mores majorum* to the enemies she subdued beyond Italy. Even the Romans spoke glibly of natural boundaries. Flamininus once illustrated the

theory very effectively (Livy xxxvi. 32) by telling of the tortoise that got into mischief by protruding its limbs beyond the protection of its shell (*quodcumque nudauit, obnoxium*). There is no proof that the Roman *testudo* contemplated extending its claws over the Aegean. Even if philhellenism could explain her abstention from free Greek cities, it cannot explain her moderation toward Macedonia, in her eyes a non-Greek state and an oppressor of Greeks. Rome had razed Capua in Italy for joining Hannibal after Cannae. Her hatred toward Philip for the same offense could have been no less exacting. Yet in spite of this, and of the fact that she could, without show of injustice or offense to Greeks, have extended her domain eastward from Illyria over Macedonia, she refused to entertain the thought when the allies suggested it. In truth, it is not a question whether or no the accessible territory is a part of Hellas. In the spirit in which the senate later refused to accept the gifts of domain when offered by Bocchus and Ptolemy, in that spirit the senate now, regardless of the dictates of philhellenism, kept its hands off eastern territory.

If then we re-read the sources of the second Macedonian war, pruning out the various anachronisms from the ancient and modern narratives, I think we shall be convinced that the war was not inspired to any appreciable degree by a policy of expansion, be it political or commercial, and that, in the treaty of peace and in the final settlement, Rome shows no intention of exacting terms or establishing conditions which shall involve her in future arbitrament of Greek affairs.

We now come to the war with Antiochus. The ancient accounts of it are not only remarkably uniform but are also consistent with a favorable interpretation of Rome's purposes. Apparently they go back to a reliable source (cf. Mommsen *R. F.* II, 511). At times, however, especially in later apocryphal speeches, a discordant note is apparent. Livy, for example, attributes to the speakers who plead in the famous suits against the Scipios such misplaced phrases as *civitatem dominam orbis terrarum* (xxxviii. 51. 4), and *L. Scipionem qui . . . imperium populi Romani propagaverit in ultimos terrarum fines* (xxxviii. 60. 5). We may doubt whether Romans of 185 B. C. spoke of their city as the

“mistress of the world,” especially when we discover that Livy borrows these words from the imaginative Antias. The speech of the *legati* in Livy xxxviii. 48, comes from the same source and is equally full of anachronisms in characterizing the ideas of an earlier day. I cannot on the unreliable authority of Antias believe that in the year 187 any Roman uttered words like *hoc tempus quo finem imperii Romani Taurum montem statuistis*. The most serious error of this kind occurs in Livy’s misreport of the speech delivered by the Rhodian envoys in behalf of the Greek cities of Asia (xxxvii. 54), and the error is here clearly due to Livy’s inability to understand Rome’s unambitious methods as reflected in the original speech. The oration as it is reported by Polybius is so entirely consistent with Rhodian character and policy that we may accept it as a fairly accurate account of the actual speech. The main theme of it is Rome’s duty of granting autonomy to the liberated cities of Asia. Livy follows Polybius (xxii. 5) literally until he reaches the explicit expression of these obligations: *καὶ μάλιστα πρέπον 'Ρωμαίοις τὸ τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀσίας Ἐλληνας ἐλευθερωθῆναι καὶ τυχεῖν τῆς αὐτονομίας τῆς ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις προσφιλεστάτης*. That unpleasant sentence Livy omits. The historian of Augustus’ day was not in a position to emphasize very strongly Rome’s broken obligations to grant “freedom and autonomy, a possession to all men the dearest.” After this brief omission Livy resumes his copying of Polybius through a flattering list of Rome’s altruistic wars; but when the speech again reverts to the necessity of establishing freedom, Livy grows impatient with the unpractical Rhodians, rolls up his Polybius and writes a peroration of his own in the grand Roman manner of his day, adorning it with the more fashionable phrases, *patrocinium, imperium, clientela*: *Hoc patrocinium receptae in fidem et clientelam uestram uniuersae gentis perpetuum uos praestare decet* (xxxvii. 54. 17) *nunc imperium ubi est ibi ut sit perpetuum optant, libertatem uestris tueri armis satis habent, quoniam suis non possunt* (*ibid.* 25). This is enough to illustrate how dangerous is the guidance of Livy when he attempts to explain the simpler administrative policies of an earlier epoch. Nevertheless these very passages are constantly quoted as authori-

tative by the historians who question Rome's sincerity in proclaiming liberty to the Greeks of the East.

Freed from these misconceptions the accounts of the war become fairly consistent. The senate, finding that Antiochus was taking possession of cities whose freedom Rome had guaranteed by the treaty of Tempe, demanded that he evacuate them and desist from invading Europe. The very size of his equipment in Europe they claimed was proof positive that his preparation had the Romans in view. The fact that the Romans did not declare war for over three years after their demands were refused is the best indication of the hesitation with which they entered upon it. The terms of the treaty by which Rome safe-guarded the liberty of the free cities, gave autonomy to others that were fitted for it, and divided between Eumenes and Rhodes the rest of the captured territory speak clearly of how unswervingly she held to her policy of domesticity. There is, however, one point at which Rome's foreign policy now admitted a new practice—a temporary one perhaps, adopted for the exigencies of this war, but by precedent leaving its effects upon all that followed. I refer to the strong-handed interference of the Roman envoy, Flamininus, in Greek affairs during the war. In the year 192 Flamininus was sent to travel through Greece with a commission to gain friends for the Roman coalition against Antiochus and Aetolia. In Athens he took a hand in municipal politics (Livy xxxv. 31). In Chalcis and Demetrias he attempted to secure the ascendancy of Romanizing factions. These strongholds would obviously become a great menace to Rome if they fell into the hands of the invader. He even asked the Achaeans to postpone their quarrel with Sparta till the Roman army should arrive (Livy xxxv. 25).¹ Finally when Achaea had appropriated Zacynthus which, by right of victory must have belonged to Rome, if to anyone, he compelled the league to disgorge. Apparently he was as angry over the attempt to act without his advice as at the nature of the act.²

¹To be sure they did not heed his request. They did not even consult him regarding the disposal of Sparta when they secured it, although the last settlement of Sparta had been made by Roman treaty.

²See Livy xxxvi. 31: *castigatum leniter quod tantam rem sine auctoritate sua conatus esset, demittere exercitum iussit.*

The point to bear in mind, however, is that this interference was undertaken while directing a troublesome coalition and was absolutely necessary for the management of a uniform campaign against a diverse enemy. Flamininus had before him the very difficult task of keeping the friendship of the newly liberated cities, of retaining the help of Philip without allowing his victories to ignite his volatile conceit, of saving the Aetolians from the consequences of their own imprudence by resisting their attack without reducing them to a dependency, and of preventing the ambitious Achaeans from bringing new enemies upon the coalition by their bellicose proselytizing. Flamininus' interference was therefore a necessity by the very nature of the war, and there is nothing in the character of his acts which would lead to the implication that Rome intended to continue her supervision in purely Greek affairs after the danger was over. In fact when the war was concluded she adopted a policy of *laissez faire* and adhered to it for some time in spite of acts committed in Achaea which were contrary not only to her wishes but also to the terms of her settlement in 194.

In attempting to estimate the effects of the war with Antiochus upon Rome's foreign policy I think we must reach the following conclusions: There is no proof that Rome was moved by the purpose of aggrandizement or of permanently extending her sphere of influence. The nature of her demands and the character of the final terms interpreted at face value testify against such an assumption. The exigencies of the war, however, induced Rome to interfere temporarily in Greek affairs to such a degree that a decided precedent was established for the future. Rome thus discovered a short-cut path to the attainment of ends that might some day appear desirable. Finally in her effort to suppress a crying nuisance, Rome was compelled to make Aetolia an "ally," i. e., to reduce her to a state of dependency. The importance of this step does not lie in any material advantages to Rome, for there were none, but in the very fact that now for the first time a Greek state was in a position where it might have to accept orders from Rome. This situation could easily necessitate Roman interference in Greece from time to time, though, as a matter of fact, Aetolia

was left very largely to her own devices during the ensuing years of peace.

As we have seen it is not apparent that Rome had at the end of the war with Antiochus adopted a permanent programme with reference to her future relations with Greece. The events of the following ten years, however, so shaped Rome's course that by the year 180, whether or no her future policy was then consciously adopted, she had at least taken certain momentous steps which revealed what the end must be. To gain a consistent view of the trend of these events we shall again find it necessary to remove some misconceptions that have come from biased sources. Polybius, in spite of his remarkable impartiality is here at no little fault; and, just because of his excellent reputation he has been the cause of some serious errors in later writers. A close scrutiny will reveal some of his inconsistencies.

It will be remembered that at the end of the war with Antiochus Polybius was a young man of about twenty years. As the son of Lycortas, the Achaean praetor of 184, he was early introduced into the political discussions of the Achaean league. Now when we remember that Lycortas was during these very years the mainstay of Philopoemen in his opposition to the Romanizing faction we can understand how difficult it must have been for Polybius to preserve absolute fairness in narrating the story of Rome's encroachment upon Achaean sovereignty. His prejudice appears unmistakably in the famous speech which he attributes to his father (see Livy xxxix. 36, apparently a direct translation from Polybius). The speech minimizes the atrocities of Philopoemen's treatment of Sparta, it incorrectly implies that Rome's intervention in Achaean affairs was uninvited, and, what is palpably false, it claims that the Achaean generals were not responsible for the massacre of the eighty Spartan envoys at Compasium.¹ Thus Polybius with commendable devotion to the cause writes a persua-

¹Philopoemen's responsibility in the massacre may be established by a careful examination of Polybius' own account of the affair (as it appears in Livy xxxviii. 33) careful though he is not to mention his hero's name. Note the impersonal way in which it is described: *cum auersis auribus pauca locuti essent, damnati omnes et traditi sunt ad supplicium*. Polybius may also be suppressing facts in placing the number of the slain at eighty. At any rate Plutarch who has access to unprejudiced sources gives the number as three hundred and fifty (*Phil.* 16).

sive apology for his father Lycortas and his favorite hero Philopoemen without directly attacking Rome. It is time, however, that we recognize the true nature of this speech and cease referring to it for historical data.

There is indeed one charge made in this speech of Lycortas that deserves fuller discussion not only because Polybius implicitly makes it again but also because it has so often been repeated since his time. In the words: *Cur ego quid Capua capta feceritis Romani non quaero, uos rationem reposcitis quid Achaei Lace-daemoniis bello uictis fecerimus* (Livy xxxix. 37, from Pol.) the charge is perfectly apparent that Rome is officially interfering without invitation. Now a close examination of Polybius shows that he is prone to suppress information regarding Achaea's appeals to Rome for arbitration. Lycortas' charge would obviously have no point if it was found that Rome intervened only when requested. Note for instance the suspicious method which Polybius adopts in reporting the embroglio of 187 (Pol. xxii. 3). He tells of how a Spartan embassy went to Rome to report the despotic acts of Philopoemen, and, then how, after some time ($\tau\acute{e}\lambda\sigma$), the Roman consul wrote to Achaea regarding the matter. Finally he adds, as though it had little to do with the preceding, that simultaneously with the Spartan embassy an Achaean envoy had also gone to Rome: *ἀν πρεσβευόντων, εὐθέως* (xxii. 3. 4). In other words, though Polybius is apparently not willing to suppress the fact that Achaea was appealing to Rome, he nevertheless would like very much to have the report spread abroad that Rome's decisions regarding Achaea were rendered on *ex parte* testimony previous to any appeal from the league. The impression left by Polybius has crystallized into definite statement in later writers and forms the judgment found in most of our histories (cf., e. g., Colin, p. 218).

Having given this illustration of the prejudices which must be avoided, I shall, without discussing controverted points, enumerate the main events in the story of the Roman-Achaean diplomacy of the years 190-180 with a view to showing how and why the foreign policy of the senate changed throughout this period. When Philopoemen had annexed Sparta to the Achaean league—note

that Rome did not interfere—he took every possible measure to diminish its power, for he hated the city (Livy xxxviii. 31). Sparta thereupon threw off its alliance with the league and appealed to Rome, asking to be received as a dependent. At the same time Achaea also sent envoys to the senate in order to support her interests, but the envoys did not act in harmony and accordingly accomplished nothing. Rome, just on the point of withdrawing from Greece, refused to become further involved in the controversy. Philopoemen then marched upon Sparta, ordered the city's walls torn down, had some eighty Spartan envoys massacred after a summary trial—in spite of a promise of safe-conduct—and committed other atrocities which amply proved how unfit the Achaeans were to govern (Livy xxxviii. 33). At this juncture both the Spartans and the Achaeans sent envoys to the senate to learn its opinion of the matter. All realized that this was a case for intervention if the senate had any intention of seeing the spirit of its Peloponnesian settlement heeded or any expression of its wishes regarded. Again the senate refused to interfere, merely expressing its disapproval of the murder at Compasium and the destruction of the Spartan walls (Pol. xxii. 3 and 10). This was the only “intervention” that could be gotten from the senate for four years.

In the year 185, however, there was a change. Reports reached Rome that Philip was breaking the terms of his treaty and preparing for war. The senate then saw that its work in the East was not yet finished, that Philip must be reckoned with some day, and that it would be well to have all other quarrels in Greece settled against that day.¹ Therefore Caecilius, who was being sent as envoy to Philip, was also² commissioned to investigate the

¹ I must admit that the motivation I here offer of Rome's behavior cannot be demonstrated absolutely. It seems, however, to explain the facts more satisfactorily than any other suggestions that I have seen.

² Polybius, to be sure, does not say that Caecilius had a commission; in fact he implies the contrary. Colin therefore infers that Caecilius is acting upon his own responsibility and that his behavior furnishes a good illustration of the impudent manner which Roman officials had learned to assume toward Greek states. Nevertheless I think the evidence of other passages indicates that Caecilius actually carried an explicit order from the senate. The evidence is as follows: 1. Caecilius, on his return, included a statement concerning Achaeian affairs in his official report. He would hardly have done this had he not been ordered to investigate them (see

still unsettled Achaeo-Spartan quarrel. When he arrived the Achaeans questioned his authority to represent the senate (Pol. xxii. 13). This so angered him that he forthwith left for Rome, and in his official report to the senate included a severe arraignment of the Achaean league. Now the Achaeans, seeing the blunder they had committed, hastened to inform the senate that their recent action was necessitated by their laws. Meanwhile, Spartan envoys were again presenting their old petition for consideration. The senate thereupon commissioned its new envoy to Philip, one Appius Claudius, to review the whole matter with the Achaean league upon his return from Macedonia (Pol. xxii. 16; Livy xxxix. 33). When Claudius arrived, Lycortas in the presence of the league defended the course of Achaea toward Sparta with arguments that gained much applause, but were far from convincing to the Roman.

Claudius' answer was brief and brutal: *dum liceret uoluntate sua facere gratiam inirent ne mox inuiti et coacti facerent* (Livy xxxix. 37). These words are consistent with Rome's method of treating Achaea from this time on, and may well be accepted as giving the spirit, at least, of the reply. The reasons for this new tone are easily discernible. The Achaeans had just committed a second blunder by condemning to death two Spartans for carrying a petition to Rome. In case of a new war with Philip, a state capable of such intemperance would be dangerous if left entirely to its own devices. From this time on, the senate was determined that as long as there was any fear of trouble from Macedonia—and trouble was apparently very near at hand—it would issue its rescripts to the Greek states rather as orders than as suggestions, and that, when Rome's interests were in jeopardy, it would issue such orders on its own initiative. It is significant, however, that

Pol. xxii. 15). 2. The senate, with special reference to Caecilius' experience, asked the Achaeans to give respectful consideration to Roman envoys *sent to them* (Pol. xxii. 16), thereby implying that Caecilius had orders to include Achaea in his investigation. 3. Finally, Caecilius is mentioned in Pol. xxiii. 4. 7 as one of those who had before served as envoy to the Peloponnese: *καὶ πρύτερον ἥδη πεπρεψευκότας περὶ τούτων εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον*. These passages seem to me conclusive. The suspicious reticence of Polybius as to Caecilius' commission in xxii. 13, is doubtless due to a feeling that the Achaeans had blundered badly in making their hot-headed challenge, and that their mistake must not be too evident.

Claudius did not undertake to review the entire question. The firm attitude of Achaea as represented by Lycortas evidently convinced him that the senate must henceforth adopt and adhere to a fixed policy with reference to Greece. Therefore, leaving the main question untouched, he simply revoked the league's recent order condemning the two Spartan envoys and referred the dispute back to the senate.

But now affairs assumed a somewhat quieter aspect in the north through the agency of Demetrius, the son of Philip, and Rome again showed an inclination to disregard Greece. In fact, nothing further was done until 183 (Pol. xxiii. 4) when another appeal came from Sparta and another embassy arrived from Achaea to oppose it. Then the senate delegated a commission of three men who best knew the status of the whole case to arrange a final settlement. This they did in a session held at Rome, completely disregarding Achaea's claims of being a sovereign power. In fact the Achaeans present were asked to sign an agreement which openly involved their breaking the laws and treaties of the league. And they signed it. (Cf. Pol. xxiii. 4 and Paus. vii. 9.) By this decision Achaea was to restore the exiles and to rebuild Sparta's walls. Quintus Marcius was sent to deliver the senate's decision to Achaea. The Achaeans, however, voted not to obey Rome's command, on the plea that if the case were properly presented at Rome the senate would retract its order.¹ Some time later, Achaea, disregarding the senate, made her own agreement with Sparta, accepting her as a member of the league on the signed promise that the exiles were *not* to be recalled (Pol. xxiii. 18 and xxiv. 11). The senate must have resented this act, yet it saw no good ground upon which to force the issue. Meanwhile, the situation in Macedonia was growing more serious. Demetrius, whom the Romans had hoped to see as Philip's successor, was poisoned. Rome no longer had any way of checkmating her enemies in Macedonia. Accordingly, in the year 180, she once more sent a note reminding Achaea of the decision of the triumviri. This brought on the crisis. Lycortas, taught in

¹ It was at this time, too, that they refused to submit their dispute with Messene to the senate, when advised to do so by Marcius. The senate, however, showed no resentment at this refusal.

the Fabian school of Philopoemen, proposed trying persuasion with the Romans again. His motion carried, but, unfortunately for his plan, his enemy Callicrates secured the first place on the new embassy. This man, reckoned by later Greeks as one of the most infamous of traitors (Paus. vii. 10), did not carry out the instructions of Lycortas and the league, but, describing the division of parties in the Greek cities, advised Rome that if she would but encourage and aid the aristocratic factions in the various cities and reward those who favored her wishes, her influence would soon predominate and her rescripts would be heeded regardless of domestic legislation (Pol. xxiv. 11). The result of this speech was decisive. The senate determined to use its influence directly in the establishment of pro-Roman parties throughout Greece, and that determination begins a new chapter in the story of Roman imperialism.

If then we try to grasp the true relation of the events of 190–180, we find a trend in Rome's foreign administration that flows consistently from the purposes and achievements of the years immediately preceding. To explain the direction of that trend we need assume no policies of cunning, of pretense, or of aggrandizement, nor, on the other hand, of peculiarly un-Roman sentimentality. We need only remove the obvious inaccuracies from the sources—obvious because they are so easily proved to be of late invention, or, at worst, prejudiced and inconsistent with well-founded data—and then the facts emerge which may be accepted at face value. According to these facts, Rome entered the war of 200 in response to certain treaty obligations. During the war she made the discovery that she was the real power of the new coalition, and she then practically assumed direction of affairs. When Philip was defeated, Rome accepted none of the surrendered territory, partly because she had entered the war in defense of her allied friends, mainly, however, because she had no desire for foreign territory. The war with Antiochus resulted directly from his disregard of the terms of the Macedonian settlement. In this war Rome was the acknowledged leader and as such assumed the direction of the campaign as well as the arbitrament of disputes between the states which she then directed. After the war

she again withdrew as far as possible from foreign affairs until, when her former settlement in the East seemed endangered by Philip (about 185), she perceived the necessity of securing tranquillity throughout Greece. She then asked for a settlement of the disputes in southern Greece. When this request was disregarded, and the dangers that induced her to make the request increased (about 180), she decided to establish a group of Romanizing parties which would secure the execution of her orders. There is no ground for believing that even then Rome looked forward to the ultimate possession of Greece or even to permanent intervention. Yet this act, in completely ignoring the sovereign rights of the Greek states, inaugurated a new policy which resulted after thirty years of turmoil in the fall of Corinth and the subjugation of Greece.

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